If you\u2019re familiar with Hashed Out, you already know we\u2019ve been extremely outspoken on this topic<\/a> \u2013 it\u2019s an awful idea. And if you\u2019re familiar with me, you can safely assume that our CEO is having a cardiac event as he\u2019s reading this headline. So, quickly, a disclaimer. Though the case we\u2019re about to lay out is tangentially related to politics, this is not a political article. It\u2019s a thought exercise. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Beside, originally the example I chose was gun control,\nwhich is much more contentious than whether it should be legal to sell booze. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This is going to be a fairly US-centric discussion, but then, it was the US Attorney General that made the most recent round of comments. And when it comes to tech, the US is a pretty good bellwether. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The question is simple, what if we applied the same\nattitudes we have about gun control, and in the past \u2013 prohibition \u2013 to the\nencryption debate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n And no, it\u2019s not that the only way to stop is a bad guy with\nencryption is a good guy with encryption\u2026 <\/p>\n\n\n\n It\u2019s that weakening or even banning encryption doesn\u2019t\npunish criminals. It punishes law abiding citizens. As we\u2019re about to discuss,\nit\u2019s really not that hard to spin up an encrypted messenger app and distribute\nit among you and your friends. Or your terrorist buddies. Or your human\ntrafficker pals. Or really any ne\u2019er-do-well that criminals share an orbit with.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, today we\u2019re going to kick the tires on the \u201cgoing silent\u201d encryption debate, talk about creating your own encrypted messenger app and then we\u2019ll talk about whether these law enforcement agencies are even making their case in good faith or if this is just window dressing for an eventual surveillance state. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Let\u2019s hash it out.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n When you hear US Attorney General William Barr say: <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAs we use encryption to improve cybersecurity, we must ensure that we retain society\u2019s ability to gain lawful access to data and communications when needed to respond to criminal activity\u2026\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It sounds perfectly reasonable on its face. It\u2019s not. <\/p>\n\n\n\n I really don\u2019t want to turn this into a civics lesson but\nthere\u2019s a lot of ground to cover here and we\u2019re going to need to contextualize\nit properly. There\u2019s a technical reason that this isn\u2019t a reasonable request,\nand then there\u2019s also a bit of spin on it that misrepresents what\u2019s actually at\nstake here, too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Let\u2019s start with the technical side \u2013 there\u2019s just no way to\ndo what law enforcement is asking in the way that it\u2019s asking. <\/p>\n\n\n\n To effectively create the type of legal access to encryption that is being requested \u2013 and not just in the US, Australia just passed a truly terrible piece of legislation<\/a>, too \u2013 you really only have two viable options.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Of the two methods, I\u2019d argue that key escrow represents the\nlesser of the two evils. But really, that\u2019s like being asked if you\u2019d rather be\nconstipated or incontinent \u2013 they\u2019re both shitty options. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Key Escrow would involve a trusted third party storing ALL\nthe keys \u2013 the idea being law enforcement could take a warrant to the entity\nadministering the secure key store. There are a ton of problems with this idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For starters, that\u2019s a ton of keys. The average enterprise is managing over 80,000 private keys<\/a>. And managing those keys is a massive challenge for those companies. We work with a ton of them. They fall into one of two categories, either they\u2019re drowning in keys and constantly losing money because of compromises and mismanagement \u2013 or they\u2019re our customers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n All kidding aside though, the biggest companies in the world\nstruggle to manage their private keys. And that\u2019s in spite of all the money and\nresources they invest in it. Now, in order to operate a key escrow system, you have\nto either trust one (or several) of those Enterprise companies with the\nresources to manage all those extra keys at scale \u2013 OR you have to trust the government.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n And trusting the government extends beyond just trusting it\nto maintain the key store on both technical and security levels, it means trusting\nthe government not to misuse the keystore. What kind of oversight gets baked\ninto that? Any? We\u2019re still reeling from the Shadow Brokers and Edward Snowden\npulling the curtain back on the United States\u2019 domestic surveillance program. Credibility\nisn\u2019t exactly soaring.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And then there\u2019s the security aspect. Unless you\u2019re air gapping<\/a> the location of the keys \u2013 or storing them printed on paper \u2013 you\u2019re going to need to have Fort Knox levels of security to ensure it remains un-breached. And before saying, \u201cwell I guess we\u2019ll air gap them,\u201d that ignores how you\u2019re going to constantly upload and update this database of keys. Because new keys are generated every second and you have to store them all. And you have to keep all of the old ones stored, too \u2013 lest the conversations that used them be lost forever.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That\u2019s just not a tenable solution. Even if the key storage\nis decentralized and done proprietarily by the vendors, you\u2019re only increasing\nthe attack surface and the number of parties you have to trust with security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The other method involves backdooring encryption, which sounds incredibly abstract but really just involves the number generators that are used in these cryptosystems. Random Number Generators<\/a> \u2013 which were at the center of the PKI industry\u2019s recent serial number snafu<\/a> \u2013 are what generate the seeds that are used to create encryption keys. If you know the seeds that are being used, it\u2019s a lot easier to guess the value that is the private key. <\/p>\n\n\n\n When you include an encryption backdoor, you\u2019re essentially divulging what seed range you\u2019re using to whatever party you\u2019re weakening your encryption for. This would be less of a problem if these RNGs were truly random, but one of the biggest problems facing our industry right now<\/a> is that they\u2019re really not. And what makes things worse is a lot of these different implementations use the same seeds. So, it\u2019s not a backdoor that\u2019s opened on a case-by-case basis, putting that backdoor in undermines ALL encryption done with that cryptosystem \u2013 it\u2019s not limited to just the device that law enforcement has a warrant to search.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is no master key solution. And even if there were,\nthat\u2019s a fatally flawed idea, too. So, the idea is either to create the most\nhigh-value target in the history of the internet and task some company or government\nagency to administer it safely and efficiently. Or undermine encryption for\neveryone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Remember earlier we tossed out a parallel to prohibition? Let\u2019s talk about that, because on their face these two things might seem kind of unrelated \u2013 they’re not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 1920 the US banned the sale, production and import of alcohol. All alcohol. There was a litany of reasons, a lot of them related to puritanism and \u201cfixing the ills\u201d present in society. Fun fact, by 1830, when temperance movements were first being started, the average American was drinking 1.7 bottles of hard liquor per week<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Either way, prohibition was presented as a completely reasonable, moral initiative. <\/p>\n\n\n\n And it was an epic failure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Part of that is due to the aforementioned argument. Banning booze,\nor even heavily restricting it will only serve to disenfranchise law-abiding\ncitizens. Criminals are still going to do whatever they want. They don\u2019t follow\nlaws \u2013 that\u2019s kind of what the whole \u201cbeing a criminal\u201d thing is all about. <\/p>\n\n\n\n And that\u2019s exactly what happened with prohibition. Instead of staying sober, an entire black market liquor economy popped up, only rather than being controlled, regulated and taxed by the government, it was run by criminals. You can still go to Chicago to this day and see the tunnels that Al Capone used to sneak his liquor through.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This encryption debate is being presented as a reasonable request by law enforcement, too \u2013 just a way to ensure they can access criminals\u2019 phones. That\u2019s incredibly misleading. This is a fourth amendment issue. The US fourth amendment reads in part that it guarantees:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Now, the obvious place to point is at the tail end where it\ngets into legal warrants. And that\u2019s all good. But there\u2019s a big difference between\nasking to serve a warrant that is legitimately granted through the proper\nchannels and pre-emptively compelling a company to break its own product\u2019s\nsecurity so it can comply with a warrant once one is eventually granted. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, I\u2019m not a legal scholar, I can\u2019t speak to case law and\nlegal precedents when it comes to this sort of thing. But that\u2019s entirely the\npoint. These are points of contentions that NEED to be decided by a court and\nnot via some extra-judicial decree by the US Justice Department. There\u2019s a lot\nof very murky, grey area that surrounds this debate and neither the tech\nindustry, nor the law enforcement apparatus in this country have the objectivity\nto weigh out both sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And here\u2019s the thing: going back to the prohibition parallel, encryption backdoors and key escrow are only going to hamstring regular, law-abiding citizens. And while it\u2019s easy to say those law-abiding citizens have nothing to worry about, the NSA said the same thing about the Patriot Act. I\u2019m not saying you shouldn\u2019t trust the US government. I\u2019m saying I don\u2019t. <\/p>\n\n\n\n More importantly, the solution wouldn\u2019t even solve the problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There will always be other secure messenger and full-disk encryption apps that operate outside of the legal jurisdiction of the countries demanding legal access to our devices. <\/p>\n\n\n\n And even if there aren\u2019t \u2013 it\u2019s not really that hard to make your own encrypted messenger app.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Think I\u2019m kidding? You\u2019d need moderate technical skills and two\nthings to make one:<\/p>\n\n\n\n You wouldn\u2019t even need to use an obscure software library. Hell, you could probably use an SSL\/TLS library if you wanted. Just for kicks and giggles I put an ad up on Fiverr looking for someone to design one for me and got six responses from developers in the first hour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Full disk encryption isn\u2019t any harder.<\/p>\n\n\n\n All that breaking encryption will do is send these criminals further underground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Just like booze during the age of prohibition, those encryption solutions will still be produced. Criminals will still be tunneling right underneath us. Only now those tunnels will be encrypted. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Let\u2019s think about the people that law enforcement are most\ninterested in keeping tabs on:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Obviously, there\u2019s more than that but it\u2019s been a few years since I\u2019ve played Grand Theft Auto so my criminal recall isn\u2019t what it used to be. Regardless of how incomplete that list is, one thing most modern criminal enterprises have in common is they\u2019re making money on, or facilitating their crime with the internet<\/a>. Whether it\u2019s selling counterfeit goods or some light corporate espionage and hacking, these criminals are not dumb. At least not on an organizational level. They have people who can code, who can program a little. They\u2019re going to know how to spin up their own encryption solutions<\/a>, or at the very least they\u2019ll know how to find someone who can. <\/p>\n\n\n\n And guess what, they\u2019re not going to be sending the FBI their seeds and nonces or logging their keys with the designated escrow service. And any metadata or intel that law enforcement may have been able to collect from the apps they were originally using will now be completely lost.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It\u2019s also worth pointing out that undermining encryption isn\u2019t even necessary. The Apple-FBI case that served as the opening salvo for this debate was rendered moot when the FBI was able to contract a third party to crack the phone. The FBI also lied about the number of devices it couldn\u2019t access<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And then there was the guidance from the European Commission\u2019s Working Party 29<\/a>, which is worth the comparison because it shows how other Western nations view the encryption debate. WP 29\u2019s guidance can basically be summarized as: use what you already have<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That includes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Undermining, or even outright banning \u2013 as the Trump administration has considered<\/a> \u2013 some forms of encryption is a nuclear option, but we haven\u2019t reached nuclear levels yet. <\/p>\n\n\n\n And if we ever do, as was stated earlier, banning and undermining the most popular encrypted messaging services is only going to push the criminal element further underground and make them harder to track and catch.<\/p>\n\n\nThe government wants to fight for its right to (be) party (to your encrypted\nconversations)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/bigstock-Policeman-Yelling-Stop-Retro-17344970-300x294.png\")
<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\nKey Escrow<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\nEncryption Backdoors<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\nThis isn\u2019t just about legal access<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
US Alcohol Consumption by Year<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/capone.png\")
<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\nIt isn’t that hard to spin up your own encryption<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\nUse what you already have<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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<\/figure>\n\n\n\n