{"id":3010,"date":"2016-09-09T13:54:44","date_gmt":"2016-09-09T13:54:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/?p=3010"},"modified":"2018-10-02T06:32:07","modified_gmt":"2018-10-02T10:32:07","slug":"woes-worsen-wosign","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/woes-worsen-wosign\/","title":{"rendered":"Woes Worsen for WoSign"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2>The investigation into WoSign is bringing more failures to light.<\/h2>\n<p>One of the more troubling breaches of Certificate Authority (CA) trust has been unfolding on <a href=\"https:\/\/groups.google.com\/forum\/#!forum\/mozilla.dev.security.policy\">Mozilla\u2019s Security Policy forum<\/a> over the past few weeks. In August, it was discovered that the Chinese CA, WoSign, had issued SSL certificates signed with the SHA-1 algorithm, which has been forbidden by industry requirements since the beginning of 2016.<\/p>\n<p>Complicating things further, the mis-issued certificates had been back-dated in order to appear as if they were issued in 2015 \u2013 at a time when SHA-1 was still permissible \u2013 allowing the certificates to circumvent browsers\u2019 measures to block those certificates. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wosign-mis-issued-sha-1-ssl\">We covered the original violation<\/a> late last month.<\/p>\n<p>This initial incident prompted a closer look at WoSign\u2019s issuance practices, and has opened a veritable Pandora\u2019s box, revealing a number of other violations. Mozilla has <a href=\"https:\/\/wiki.mozilla.org\/CA:WoSign_Issues\">documented 12 different issues<\/a>, more than half of which constitute major violations of industry standards. One of the most alarming discoveries was that WoSign\u2019s system allowed <a href=\"https:\/\/wiki.mozilla.org\/CA:WoSign_Issues#Bug_N2\">users to add arbitrary domains to their certificate<\/a> without proving ownership over them. This violates one of the most fundamental principles of internet PKI: that users have proved ownership of the requested domains in their certificate.<\/p>\n<p>There have also been allegations that WoSign <a href=\"https:\/\/groups.google.com\/forum\/#!msg\/mozilla.dev.security.policy\/k9PBmyLCi8I\/xHr80bgRCwAJ\">mis-issued a certificate for alicdn.com<\/a> &#8211; a site operated by AliBaba, China\u2019s biggest eCommerce company. It is not yet known if this certificate was improperly issued, and Mozilla is still investigating how the certificates was issued.<\/p>\n<p>On September 4<sup>th,<\/sup> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wosign.com\/report\/wosign_incidents_report_09042016.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow\">WoSign released a formal incident report<\/a> addressing a handful of the violations that have been discovered. The 20-page report attempted to explain the manner in which these violations had occurred in addition to outlining WoSign\u2019s response and solutions. However, the report raised <a href=\"https:\/\/groups.google.com\/forum\/#!msg\/mozilla.dev.security.policy\/k9PBmyLCi8I\/_WMk3F65DgAJ\">even more questions<\/a>, including why it failed to acknowledge other known issues.<\/p>\n<p>Mozilla has also <a href=\"https:\/\/groups.google.com\/forum\/#!topic\/mozilla.dev.security.policy\/0pqpLJ_lCJQ\">shared evidence that WoSign has allegedly acquired another CA<\/a>, the Israeli company Startcom, in late 2015. The relationship between WoSign and Startcom has been questioned since it was discovered that certificates signed by WoSign could be acquired through Startcom\u2019s StartEncrypt software.<\/p>\n<p>Neither WoSign nor Startcom publicly announced the acquisition. While CAs are often acquired by competitors, it is unusual for it to be done in secret. Gervase Markham, a member of Mozilla\u2019s CA team, notes that while \u201cnone of what is described is illegal,\u201d failure to disclose a change of corporate ownership does violate Mozilla\u2019s CA policy requirements and the bylaws of the Certificate Authority &amp; Browser Forum (CA\/B Forum). Both CAs have continued to vote in the CA\/B Forum as separate parties since the alleged acquisition.<\/p>\n<p>Despite legal incorporation documents stating otherwise, Wosign\u2019s CEO Richard Wang is maintaining that an acquisition has not (yet) occurred. Wang wrote \u201can announcement and disclosure will be made shortly pending completion of the business transaction.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The entire incident has been a cat and mouse game. Every time WoSign discloses a violation, more problems are found that WoSign missed or failed to disclose. Despite the increased scrutiny, WoSign has continued to give incomplete and imprecise responses. The thread where these incidents are being discussed with WoSign\u2019s CEO Richard Wang has already passed 180 posts and the tone has taken a noticeably negative shift in recent days.<\/p>\n<p>It is still not known how major browsers will respond to WoSign\u2019s violations, but members of the browser community have expressed concern that WoSign does not appear to have a strong awareness of its own operations as a CA, what certificates it is issuing, and how those certificates are being validated. If WoSign is untrusted it will essentially be the end of their business as a CA.<\/p>\n<p>Discussions of WoSign\u2019s misconduct have been <a href=\"https:\/\/bugzilla.mozilla.org\/show_bug.cgi?id=1293366#c5\" rel=\"nofollow\">going on for a month now<\/a>, and WoSign\u2019s CEO is hoping that the company can soon move past this episode.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cUnfortunately,\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/groups.google.com\/forum\/#!msg\/mozilla.dev.security.policy\/k9PBmyLCi8I\/OSiKUmGjDgAJ\">wrote Markham<\/a>, \u201cI think we may be only beginning.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The investigation into WoSign is bringing more failures to light. One of the more troubling breaches of Certificate Authority (CA) trust has been unfolding on Mozilla\u2019s Security Policy forum over&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":3011,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":"","tve_updated_post":"","tve_custom_css":"","tve_user_custom_css":"","tve_globals":{},"tcb2_ready":0,"tcb_editor_enabled":0,"tve_landing_page":"","_tve_header":"","_tve_footer":""},"categories":[17],"tags":[164,188,192,186],"class_list":["post-3010","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-industry-lowdown","tag-certificate-authorities","tag-mis-issuance","tag-mozilla","tag-wosign","post-with-tags"],"views":8715,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/09\/Depositphotos_62318453_m-2015.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3010","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3010"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3010\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3011"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3010"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3010"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thesslstore.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3010"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}